It was 20 years in the past at the moment (Feb. 1) that seven astronauts misplaced their lives throughout a spaceflight.
The spacecraft Columbia broke up throughout the touchdown phase of the STS-107 mission in 2003, scattering items of the space shuttle throughout the southern United States. The company paused shuttle flights for greater than two years whereas investigating the causes of the incident, and solely resumed full flight operations in 2006.
A number of NASA astronauts shared their experiences of the tragic day throughout an company city corridor Jan. 26 to mark the company’s annual Day of Remembrance for fallen spaceflyers.
“I need to encourage any of you who weren’t right here when Columbia occurred, to hunt out somebody who was — and ask them to inform their story, the way it affected them and the way it affected the company,” NASA deputy administrator Pam Melroy stated on the livestreamed city corridor.
Melroy, a two-time space shuttle astronaut who was on the company throughout the Columbia tragedy, stated NASA should preserve an “acute consciousness” of “why we should at all times concentrate on security, and never stress to launch … why we should be rigorous in groups to verify we’re not making use of groupthink to a fancy situation.”
Associated: Columbia report faults NASA culture, government oversight
Like all spacecraft accidents, the basis causes of Columbia’s and its crew’s demise had been complicated. These causes are detailed in a six-volume report (opens in new tab) issued by the unbiased Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) later in 2003.
In keeping with that board, the first technical reason behind the incident was a bit of froth insulation that fell unfastened from a “bipod” (shuttle attachment) area of the exterior gasoline tank throughout the flight’s launch on Jan. 16, putting the forefront of Columbia’s left wing. The falling foam precipitated a breach within the re-entry safety system wanted to guard the crew because the shuttle got here again into Earth’s atmosphere.
Related to that technical situation was a sequence of associated organizational issues corresponding to a scarcity of imaginative and prescient, immense schedule stress for launches, price range constraints and cutbacks to the company’s workforce, CAIB investigations discovered.
“It’s our view that complicated programs nearly at all times fail in complicated methods, and we consider it could be unsuitable to scale back the complexities and weaknesses related to these programs to some easy clarification,” CAIB members wrote of their introduction (opens in new tab) to the primary quantity.
“Too usually, accident investigations blame a failure solely on the final step in a fancy course of, when a extra complete understanding of that course of may reveal that earlier steps may be equally or much more culpable.”
Associated: Space shuttle Columbia’s final mission (STS-107) in photos
Foam shedding had occurred quite a few occasions earlier than throughout shuttle launches, although the shuttle system wasn’t designed to do it; CAIB officers advised foam loss occurred on greater than 80% of 79 missions “for which imagery was out there to verify or rule out foam loss.”
Throughout Columbia’s last flight, NASA engineers knew the froth had struck the shuttle’s wing and a number of other “particles evaluation” conferences had been held, in line with CAIB documentation (opens in new tab) primarily based on a sequence of interviews and company e-mails obtained by board members. NASA had additionally issued a short request to the U.S. Division of Protection for high-resolution “spy satellite” imagery of the affected space, however rescinded it inside 90 minutes, CAIB evaluation decided.
“Mission managers understood that the related query was not whether or not foam posed a safety-of-flight situation — it did — however moderately whether or not the noticed foam strike contained enough kinetic power to trigger harm that might result in a burn-through,” CAIB wrote within the second quantity of its report.
“Right here, all the important thing managers had been asking the best query and admitting the hazard. They even recognized [the tiles] as a vital affect zone. But little follow-through occurred with both the request for imagery, or the particles evaluation crew evaluation.”
House historian John Logsdon served on CAIB and advised House.com that, in his view, a number of of the issues recognized within the Challenger space shuttle’s deadly accident of 1986, which killed seven astronauts, recurred throughout Columbia.
Challenger’s demise resulted from an explosion throughout launch because of the failure of a key half in a stable rocket booster, often called an O-ring, however schedule stress and different organizational issues performed a job as properly.
Logsdon recalled fellow board member and former NASA astronaut Sally Ride, who had served on the board investigating Challenger as properly, telling her fellow CAIB members that she heard “echoes of Challenger” in Columbia’s demise.
A complete chapter in Quantity 1 of CAIB compares the assorted causes of the 2 accidents, opening with a press release saying the Columbia board noticed “unlucky similarities between the company’s efficiency and security practices in each durations” previous to the 2 shuttle tragedies.
At NASA at the moment, the atmosphere surrounding crewed missions is complicated otherwise, Logsdon stated. The company offers contractors for its International Space Station business crew program (SpaceX and Boeing) extra oversight of their very own spacecraft, for instance. Moreover, a collection of NASA astronauts fly aboard Soyuz spacecraft which can be managed by Russia’s space company, Roscosmos.
Logsdon stated that as a semi-retired professor emeritus at George Washington College in Washington, D.C., not taking a look at day-to-day space actions, “I am not comfy passing judgment on the present state of the protection program.” That stated, Logsdon famous “widespread sense” would make it unlikely {that a} third security incident would come up in precisely the identical manner as Challenger or Columbia.
NASA administrator Invoice Nelson stated on the city corridor that the company is dedicated to remaining cautious and listening to the consultants. “Converse up,” he advised workers. “A query, even a easy query, is extra forgivable than a mistake that can lead to a tragedy.”
Nelson himself flew on a space shuttle mission that landed lower than two weeks earlier than the Challenger catastrophe.
“Every of us,” Nelson stated, “has a duty to domesticate a piece atmosphere the place each member of the NASA household feels empowered to voice doubt. Make your considerations heard. Talk overtly.”
Observe Elizabeth Howell on Twitter @howellspace (opens in new tab). Observe us on Twitter @Spacedotcom (opens in new tab) or Fb.
